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Notes
"REASONABLE PARTICULARITY" IN INDICTMENTS
AGAINST CHILD ABUSERS
A. "Reasonable Particularity'" Standard
In State v. Mulkey,' the Court of Appeals held that an indictment
of child and sexual abuse crimes, which specified only that the of-
fenses occurred sometime within a particular three-month period,
was valid under the "right to be informed of the accusation" provi-
sion of the Maryland Constitution.2 The court declined to decide
whether such an indictment met the new standard of "reasonable
particularity" under Maryland Rule 4-202(a);' such a decision would
have been premature because the State had failed to meet its statu-
tory burden of providing the accused with a bill of particulars.4
Nevertheless, the court did list those factors that trial judges should
consider when deciding whether an indictment in a child sexual
abuse case is reasonably particular with respect to the time of the
offense.5
The court's decision in Mulkey undoubtedly was procedurally
correct; Maryland law plainly entitled Mulkey to a bill of particu-
lars,6 a fact that no one but the Court of Appeals recognized.7
Moreover, the court's decision that the indictment complied with
article 21 of Maryland's Constitution conforms with a compelling
majority of similar cases from other states.8 Finally, the guidelines
1. 316 Md. 475, 560 A.2d 24 (1989).
2. "That in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right to be informed of the
accusation against him; to have a copy of the Indictment, or charge, in due time (if
required) to prepare for his defence ...." MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTs. art. 21.
3. "A charging document shall contain.. . a concise and definite statement of the
essential facts of the offense with which the defendant is charged and, with reasonable
particularity, the time and place the offense occurred." MD. R. 4-202(a).
4. Mulkey, 316 Md. at 489, 560 A.2d at 31.
5. Id. at 488, 560 A.2d at 30.
6. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 461C(b) (1987). This section applies only to docu-
ments charging rape or sexual offenses. Id.
7. The Court of Special Appeals did not mention the statute, State v. Mulkey, 73
Md. App. 501, 534 A.2d 1374 (1988), rev'd, 316 Md. 475, 560 A.2d 24 (1989), nor did
either party cite to it in their briefs to the Court of Appeals. Briefs of Respondent and
Petitioner, Mulkey (No. 88-22). Arguably, however, the statute's applicability was not an
issue until the Court of Appeals ruled that the dismissal of the indictment was improper.
Mulkey, 316 Md. at 489, 560 A.2d at 31.
8. See infra notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
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for interpreting the "reasonable particularity" standard are a useful
place to begin for prosecutors, defense lawyers, and trial judges
who, sadly, very likely will face many cases similar to Mulkey.
1. The Case.-The State filed an indictment in the Prince
George's County Circuit Court that charged James Elwood Mulkey
with one count of child abuse9 and twelve counts of third degree
sexual offense,' 0 naming as victims two children "under age four-
teen."" The Court of Appeals divided the counts into three groups
according to the alleged time frame of the offenses.' 2
Mulkey's counsel filed two motions: one to dismiss the indict-
ment under the reasonable particularity standard of rule 4-202(a)"3
and one demanding a bill of particulars to specify the dates, times,
and locations of the offenses.1 4 After a hearing, the circuit court
judge dismissed the indictment, calling it a "gunshot remedy," and
9. Mulkey, 316 Md. at 478, 560 A.2d at 25. The State brought the charge under MD.
ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35A (1987).
10. Mulkey, 316 Md. at 478, 560 A.2d at 25. These counts were brought under
§ 464B(a)(3), which provides: "A person is guilty of a sexual offense in the third degree
if the person engages in sexual contact ... (3) With another person who is under 14
years of age and the person performing the sexual contact is four or more years older
than the victim." MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 464B(a)(3) (1987).
11. Mulkey, 316 Md. at 478, 560 A.2d at 25. If the indictment was more specific
about the victim's age, seq, or mental characteristics, neither the Court of Special Ap-
peals or the Court of Appeals apparently considered such information.
12. Id. at 479, 560 A.2d at 26. Specifically, the counts were organized as follows:
Counts 1-5: Child abuse and June 1, 1982 to
four counts of sexual offense September 6, 1982
Counts 6-9: Four counts of June 1, 1983 to
sexual offense September 5, 1983
Counts 10-12 [sic]: Four June 1, 1984 to
counts of sexual offense September 3, 1984
Id. Clearly there is an inconsistency in the 12 counts that the court organized and the 13
total counts charged in the indictment. This difference may indicate more than a simple
miscalculation. Counts 10, 11, and 12 of the indictment all stated that the offenses oc-
curred "on or about the 1st day ofJune, nineteen hundred and eighty four[,] through
the 3rd day of September, nineteen hundred and eighty four . J. " joint Record Extract
at 4, Mulkey (No. 88-22) (bracketed comma not included in Count 11 or 12). The thir-
teenth count alleged a specific offense occurring "on or about the 1st day of June,
nineteen hundred and eighty four, and the 3rd day of September, nineteen hundred and
eighty four .... " Id. at 5 (emphasis added). Read literally, the last count alleges that a
single act occurred on (or about) two different days. The court or the parties may have
considered this a fatal error and simply declined to address the final count.
13. "A charging document shall contain.., a concise and definite statement of the
essential facts of the offense with which the defendant is charged and, with reasonable
particularity, the time and place the offense occurred." MD. R. 4-202(a).
14. Mulkey, 316 Md. at 479, 560 A.2d at 26.
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ruled the motion for a bill of particulars moot.' 5
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the dismissal. 6 It first
held that the allegation of the place of the abuse, Prince George's
County, was sufficiently particular to comply with rule 4-202(a).' 7 It
further held, however, that the "indictment was defective in that the
time was not alleged with reasonable particularity."'"
The Court of Appeals considered two substantive issues before
it reversed primarily on procedural grounds. Writing for the court,
Judge Blackwell first concluded that the indictment was constitu-
tional under article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.' 9 Cit-
ing federal,'2  Maryland, 2 ' and out-of-state 22 cases, the Court of
Appeals reaffirmed "'that a charging document must allege the es-
sential elements of the offense charged,' ",23 and that "[h]ere, we
conclude the exact date of the offense is not an essential element,
and is not constitutionally required to be set forth."1
2 4
The court next considered the "reasonable particularity" re-
quirement of rule 4-202(a), calling it "a second integral step in as-
15. Id
16. Mulkey v. State, 73 Md. App. 501, 511,534 A.2d 1374, 1379 (1988), rev'd, 316 Md.
475, 560 A.2d 24 (1989).
17. Id. at 507, 534 A.2d at 1377-78. The Court of Appeals did not consider reason-
able particularity of place but it did not explicitly reverse that part of the Court of Special
Appeals' decision. Mulkey, 316 Md. at 478-79 n.3, 560 A.2d at 25 n.3.
18. Mulkey, 73 Md. App. at 509, 534 A.2d at 1379.
19. Mulkey, 316 Md. at 480-88, 560 A.2d at 26-30; see supra note 2.
20. See, e.g., Ledbetter v. United States, 170 U.S. 606, 612 (1898) (failure to state
particular day of the offense not necessarily fatal).
21. See, e.g.,Jones v. State, 303 Md. 323, 336-37, 493A.2d 1062, 1069 (1985) (com-
mon law rule in short form indictments is that charging document must implicitly or
explicitly allege the essential elements of the offense); Bonds v. State, 51 Md. App. 102,
107, 442 A.2d 572, 575-76 (1982) (upholding an eight-month time frame in an indict-
ment against a sex offender).
22. See, e.g., State v. Mancinone, 15 Conn. App. 251, 257, 545 A.2d 1131, 1135-36 (at
least when offense is of a continuing nature, state does not have a duty to disclose infor-
mation that it does not have), certif. denied, 209 Conn. 818, 551 A.2d 757 (1988), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 1132 (1989).
23. Mulkey, 316 Md. at 481, 560 A.2d at 27 (quoting Jones v. State, 303 Md. 323,
337, 493 A.2d 1062, 1069 (1985)).
24. Id. at 482, 560 A.2d at 27. It is not clear whether the "exact date" is never an
essential element in child or sexual abuse cases, or is not essential only in this case, or
whether there is a line in between yet to be drawn. The context that precedes this
quote, which discusses the general requirements of a charging document, suggests a
broad interpretation, and there is nothing in the opinion to show the court intended to
limit the holding to these facts. Language in a later section of the opinion, however,
suggests a narrower interpretation: "Mulkey was apprised of the continuing nature of
the offenses such that his defense was not prejudiced. Here, the time of the alleged
offenses is not an essential element." Id. at 488, 560 A.2d at 30.
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sessing the sufficiency of the indictment."25 While the Court of
Appeals acknowledged that the trial judge normally is in the best
position to decide reasonable particularity on a case-by-case basis,28
the court nonetheless issued a nonexhaustive list of relevant factors
that a trial court should consider when faced with a defendant
charged with sexual offenses against children: "1) the nature of the
offense; 2) the age and maturity of the child; 3) the victim's ability to
recall specific dates; and, 4) the State's good faith efforts and ability
to determine reasonable dates."127
The Court of Appeals, however, did not apply these factors to
Mulkey's case. Rather, it declared that the charging document "sub-
stantially adhered to" a general form indictment as outlined in arti-
cle 27, section 461C(a), 2s and deftly noted a further, decisive
provision of that section: "In any case in which this general form of
indictment, information, or warrant is used to charge a rape or a
sexual offense, the defendant is entitled to a bill of particulars spe-
cifically setting forth the allegations against him."29  While a bill of
particulars "[tiraditionally. .. forms no part of the indictment and
cannot be applied to cure a defective indictment,"30 the language of
article 27, section 461C(b) of the Maryland Code "indicates a
mandatory, unqualified intent."3' Hence, the court held, the trial
judge should have allowed the demand for a bill of particulars
25. Id. at 488, 560 A.2d at 30. The reasonable particularity standard for the time and
place of an offense under rule 4-202(a) replaced the "as particularly as possible stan-
dard" under former MD. R. 711 (a). The Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure has suggested that "the former test is a rather stringent test, which one day
may lead to trouble." Id. at 477-78 n.l, 560 A.2d at 25 n.l (quoting from a 1984 letter
to the Court of Appeals). With regard to certain child-victim cases, the old rule arguably
was less stringent than the new one. When a sexually abused child simply is incapable of
specifying the date of the offense and, as is often the case, there are no other witnesses,
then a broad time range in an indictment may be stated "as particularly as possible." It
nevertheless may not be "reasonably particular." See Bonds v. State, 51 Md. App. 102,
108, 442 A.2d 572, 575 (1982) (interpreting the "as particularly as possible" standard of
former rule 7 11 (a) to mean that "if it is impossible to be precise as to the exact date and
time, [the State] is not therefore foreclosed from prosecution.").
26. Mulkey, 316 Md. at 488, 560 A.2d at 30.
27. Id. Judge Blackwell emphasized that the list was not intended to be complete:
"This is not meant to serve as an all-inclusive list. We indicate these factors for the
purpose of assisting trial judges in evaluating the 'reasonable particularity' requirement
under the circumstances. A hearing may be necessary to fully ascertain the extent of the
State's knowledge regarding these factors." Id.
28. Id. at 489, 560 A.2d at 31.
29. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 461C(b) (1987).
30. Mulkey, 316 Md. at 489, 560 A.2d at 30.
31. Id., 560 A.2d at 31.
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before ruling on the motion to dismiss the indictment. 32 Further,
the trial court should have used the bill of particulars to determine
whether the time of the offenses was "reasonably particular."3 " The
Court of Appeals thus remanded the case for the trial judge to re-
consider the indictment after reviewing the bill of particulars and
then reviewing all the information in light of the four new
considerations. 4
2. Legal Background.-The narrow issue in Mulkey is this: With
what degree of particularity must a charging document specify the
time of the offense in a child abuse or child sexual abuse case? 5
Surprisingly, that precise issue has reached the appellate level many
times in recent years.36 Defendants have sought to overturn such
charging documents on a variety of legal theories that often overlap,
including: failure to be informed of the accusation,37 failure of the
charging document to protect against double jeopardy,3 failure of
the charges to assure a unanimous verdict,3 9 breach of various state
32. Id.
33. Id. at 489-90, 560 A.2d at 31.
34. Id. at 490, 560 A.2d at 31.
35. Id. at 478, 560 A.2d at 25.
36. This analysis primarily considers cases decided since 1985, and selected impor-
tant cases that were decided earlier. Mulkey is slightly unusual in that it is an attack on an
indictment before trial. Id. at 477, 560 A.2d at 25. Most of the other cases cited herein
are attacks after conviction.
37. Many of the other methods of attacking charging documents end in a conclusion
that the defendant was not adequately informed of the nature of the charges. See, e.g.,
State v. Spigarolo, 210 Conn. 359, 381-85, 556 A.2d 112, 124-25 (rejecting claim be-
cause charges sufficiently precise to meet constitutional standard), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
322 (1989); Pounds v. United States, 529 A.2d 791, 793 n.2 (D.C. 1987) (per curiam)
(apparently rejecting claim because of victim's inability to recall events by specific date
and time);Jackson v. United States, 503 A.2d 1225, 1227 (D.C. 1986) (same); People v.
Romero, 147 A.D.2d 358, 360, 537 N.Y.S.2d 523, 524 (1989) (agreeing with defendant
that five-month time frame too vague to meet constitutional standard); State v. R.A.R.,
148 Wis. 2d 408, 412-13, 435 N.W.2d 315, 316 (Ct. App. 1988) (long time lapse be-
tween offenses and filing of charges combined with unspecific dates failed adequately to
inform defendant of charges).
38. See, e.g., State v. Rudd, 759 S.W.2d 625, 628 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (rejecting claim
because entire record as well as extrinsic evidence may be used to determine validity of
plea of abatement based on former jeopardy); State v. D.B.S., 216 Mont. 234, 240, 700
P.2d 630, 635 (1985) (rejecting claim because state barred from retrying defendant for
offense against this victim for the time period in question); State v. Wurtz, 436 N.W.2d
839, 843-44 (S.D. 1989) (rejecting claim because outside evidence may be used in for-
mer jeopardy); State v. Fawcett, 145 Wis. 2d 244, 255, 426 N.W.2d 91, 96 (Ct. App.)
(rejecting claim in part because state conceded that defendant could not be charged
again with any sexual assault out of incident at issue), certif denied, 144 Wis. 2d 955, 428
N.W.2d 553 (1988).
39. The unanimous verdict theory relies partially on the indictment and partially on
events at trial. When the indictment is vague with regard to time, a jury conceivably
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statutes,4 ° denial of equal protection,41 duplicitousness,4 and a va-
riety of due process theories that largely concern the inability to
present an alibi or other defense.43 These theories have succeeded
could find all the essential elements of the offense, but not with respect to a single act.
The theory also may depend on whether the law of a particular state treats the alleged
offense as "continuing," and whether the court decides that an appropriate jury instruc-
tion can cure a vague indictment. Covington v. State, 703 P.2d 436, 440-41 (explaining
and applying the doctrine), rev'd, 711 P.2d 1183 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985); see also People v.
Jones, 51 Cal. 3d 34, 792 P.2d 643, 658, 270 Cal. Rptr. 611, 626 (1990) (in some child
molestation cases, "although the jury may not be able to readily distinguish between the
various acts, it is certainly capable of unanimously agreeing that they took place in the
number and manner described"); People v. Moreno, 211 Cal. App. 3d 776, 778-90, 259
Cal. Rptr. 800, 808-09 (1989) (concluding that jury members did not necessarily have to
specify a single act to which they unanimously agreed if they agreed that defendant did
all of the acts to which the victim testified); State v. Spigarolo, 210 Conn. 359, 388-92,
556 A.2d 112, 127-29 (noting that unanimous verdict was fundamental right that could
be reviewed even though unpreserved, but upholding convictions because "defendant's
conduct was in the nature of a continuing offense"), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 322 (1989);
State v. Fitzgerald, 39 Wash. App. 652, 655-56, 694 P.2d 1117, 1120-21 (1985) (revers-
ing conviction because no election of a particular act made by State and no appropriate
jury instruction given).
40. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 539 So. 2d 535, 536 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (statute
requiring time and place "as definitely as possible"); People v. Naugle, 152 Mich. App.
227, 229-30, 393 N.W.2d 592, 594 (1986) ("as nearly as the circumstances will permit");
State v. Hoban, 738 S.W.2d 536, 542 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) ("as definitely as can be
done"); State v. Shaver, 233 Mont. 438, 445, 760 P.2d 1230, 1234 (1988) (same); People
v. Keindl, 68 N.Y.2d 410, 416 n.2, 502 N.E.2d 577, 579 n.2, 509 N.Y.S.2d 790, 792 n.2
(1986) (indictment must contain statement that offense charged was committed "in, or
on or about, a designated date, or during a designated period of time").
41. Hoban, 738 S.W.2d at 542 (rejecting an accused child molester's theory that he
was treated "differently than defendants charged with the same crime against adult
victims").
42. See Keindl, 68 N.Y.2d at 417-18, 502 N.E.2d at 580, 509 N.Y.S.2d at 793 ("[A]cts
which separately and individually make out distinct crimes must be charged in separate
and distinct counts .. . and where one count alleges the commission of a particular
offense occurring repeatedly during a designated period of time, that count encom-
passes more than one offense and is duplicitous."); see also People v. Beauchamp, 74
N.Y.2d 639, 539 N.E.2d 1105, 541 N.Y.S.2d 977 (1989) (mem.).
43. See, e.g., People v. Jones, 51 Cal. 3d 34, 792 P.2d 643, 656-58, 270 Cal. Rptr. 611,
624-26 (1990) (discussed infra at note 111); People v. Moreno, 211 Cal. App. 3d 776,
787, 259 Cal. Rptr. 800, 807 (1989) (doubting value of alibi defense for "resident child
molester"); People v. Avina, 211 Cal. App. 3d 48, 55, 259 Cal. Rptr. 178, 183 (1989)
(rejecting alibi and mistaken identification defenses); People v. Obremski, 207 Cal. App.
3d 1346, 1351-53, 255 Cal. Rptr. 715, 718-19 (1989) (holding that defendant was es-
topped to raise the issue on appeal but doubting value of alibi or wrongful identification
defense for resident child molester); People v. Van Hoek, 200 Cal. App. 3d 811, 817,
246 Cal. Rptr. 352, 356 (1988) (reversing conviction because "[a] resident child mo-
lester would virtually be precluded from presenting an alibi defense to the acts unless he
could account for every time he was in the presence of the victim"); State v. Blasius, 211
Conn. 455, 462-63, 559 A.2d 1116, 1119-20 (1989) (reversing dismissal of indictment
because the effectiveness of an alibi defense is a factual issue); State v. Spigarolo, 210
Conn. 359, 387, 556 A.2d 112, 127 (asserting that an alibi defense may be a factor to be
considered in deciding whether to grant motion for bill of particulars but refusing to
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only rarely.44
Courts have adopted a variety of legal positions in rejecting de-
fendants' attacks. The single most frequent rationale is that time is
not an essential element in a sexual abuse case and, therefore, need
not be alleged with particularity.45 Several courts have suggested
further that the range of time alleged is sufficient if it falls entirely
within the applicable statute of limitations.46 A minority of other
overturn convictions), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 322 (1989); State v. Nunn, 244 Kan. 207,
225-27, 768 P.2d 268, 281-83 (1989) (defendant failed to show prejudice); State v.
Walker, 506 A.2d 1143, 1147 (Me. 1986) (defendant not prejudiced partially because his
own testimony placed him and victim alone together); Hoban, 738 S.W.2d at 541 (re-
jecting alibi theory because State could not be more specific as to date of offense); State
v. D.B.S., 216 Mont. 234, 239, 700 P.2d 630, 634 (1985) (alibi defense futile because
defendant had custody of victim); State v. Beermann, 231 Neb. 380, 389-92,436 N.W.2d
499. 505-07 (1989) (reversing convictions in part because the State could have stated
times with more specificity).
44. See Covington v. State, 703 P.2d 436, 440-41 (jury may not have agreed unani-
mously on any specific incident), rev'd, 711 P.2d 1183 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (not plain
error); People v. Van Hoek, 200 Cal. App. 3d 811, 818, 246 Cal. Rptr. 352, 357 (1988)
(imprecise charges impeded defendant's ability to mount an alibi defense and violated
due process). But cf. People v. Fernandez, 214 Cal. App. 3d 991, 1003-05, 263 Cal. Rptr.
139, 145-46 (1989) (rejecting Van Hoek and collecting California cases on both sides of
the issue), reiew granted No. 5013201 (Feb. 15, 1990) (Westlaw No. 19110); Moreno, 211
Cal. App. 3d at 787, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 807 (rejecting Van Hoek); Azina, 211 Cal. App. 3d
at 55, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 183 (same); People v. Coulter, 209 Cal. App. 3d 506, 513, 257
Cal. Rptr. 391, 395 (1989) (same); see also State v. Garcia, 511 So. 2d 714, 716 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1987) (two-year time span in an information could have been alleged with more
specificity); Knight v. State, 506 So. 2d 1182, 1183 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (two counts
containing more than three-year time frames violated Florida "as definitely as possible"
rule, 10 1/2 month count upheld); Beermann, 231 Neb. at 393, 436 N.W.2d at 508 (State
failed to inform defendant of the charges with reasonable certainty); State v. Hass, 218
N.J. Super. 133, 139-40, 526 A.2d 1156, 1159 (App. Div. 1987) (remanding for consid-
eration of whether defendant received fair notice in light of new factors set out by state
supreme court); Beauchamp, 74 N.Y.2d at 641, 539 N.E.2d at 1106, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 978
(holding counts of an indictment duplicitous and nine-month time frame, excluding
weekends, unreasonable); Kendl, 68 N.Y.2d at 419, 502 N.E.2d at 581, 509 N.Y.S.2d at
794 (10-, 12-, and 16-month counts of an indictment unreasonable); People v. Romero,
147 A.D.2d 358, 361-62, 537 N.Y.S.2d 523, 525-26 (1989) (mer.) (five-month time
frame unreasonably long under the circumstances and duplicitous).
45. See People v. Thomas, 770 P.2d 1324, 1330 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) ("Failure to
provide a precise time is neither essential nor decisive where, as here, neither alibi nor
nonaccess is a viable defense."), cert. granted, 1989 Colo. LEXIS 80; State v. Hoban, 738
S.W.2d 536, 539 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (interpreting statute providing that an indictment
is not invalidated for omitting time when time is not of the essence of the offense); State
v. Shaver, 233 Mont. 438, 445-46, 760 P.2d 1230, 1234-35 (1988) (rejecting a defend-
ant's contention that time is an essential element of a child abuse offense when an alibi
defense is raised). See generally 41 AM. JUR. 2D Indictments and Informations §§ 115-17
(1968).
46. Eberhardt v. State, 257 Ga. 420, 421, 359 S.E.2d 908, 909 (1987), cert. denied, 108
S. Ct. 1036 (1988); Vail v. State, 536 N.E.2d 302, 302-03 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989); State v.
Nunn, 244 Kan. 207, 227, 768 P.2d 268, 283 (1989); State v. West, 737 S.W.2d 790, 792
1014
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courts, however, have utilized a "reasonableness test" 47 by estab-
lishing specific factors for judges to consider when they decide
whether to uphold a charging document.48 Through Mulkey, Mary-
land seemingly has joined the former with regard to the constitu-
tional issue of a defendant's right to be informed of the accusation 49
and the latter with regard to interpretation of the reasonable partic-
ularity standard of rule 4-202(a). Because the rule, therefore, be-
comes the primary consideration in most cases of vague time
allegations, this Note analyzes the four factors created in Mulkey5'
and considers some additional factors that, based on out-of-state
cases, may become troublesome.5"
3. Analysis.---a. The Four Factors.-(1) The Nature of the Of-
fense.-The Mulkey court did not elaborate on any of the four factors
it listed. The "nature of the offense" element is especially broad
and thus difficult to submit to meaningful analysis before trial
judges actually have applied it. By the court's definition, the nature
(Tenn. Crim. App.), appeal denied, id. (1987); Perkins v. State, 779 S.W.2d 918, 924 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1989). But see State v. Beermann, 231 Neb. 380, 393, 436 N.W.2d 499, 508
(1989) ("an information alleging the time of an offense only by reference to the period
of time in a statute of limitations is insufficient as a matter of law.").
47. See State v. Fawcett, 145 Wis. 2d 244, 251, 426 N.W.2d 91, 94-95 (Ct. App.)
(examines the apparent origin of the term "reasonableness test"), certif denied, 144 Wis.
2d 955, 428 N.W.2d 553 (1988).
48. The leading case is People v. Morris, 61 N.Y.2d 290, 461 N.E.2d 1256, 473
N.Y.S.2d 769 (1984), which set out a list of factors to consider when deciding whether
an indictment is reasonable, much as Mulkey did. Id. at 296, 461 N.E.2d at 1260, 473
N.Y.S.2d at 773. Cases outside of New York that follow Morris to some degree include:
People v. Naugle, 152 Mich. App. 227, 234, 393 N.W.2d 592, 595-96 (1986); State ex rel
K.A.W., 104 NJ. 112, 122-23,515 A.2d 1217, 1222 (1986); Hass, 218 NJ. Super. at 138-
39, 526 A.2d at 1159; State v. R.A.R., 148 Wis. 2d 408, 411,435 N.W.2d 315, 316 (Ct.
App. 1988); Fawcett, 145 Wis. 2d at 251-53, 426 N.W.2d at 94-95.
49. See supra note 2.
50. Although the court did not intend the list to be all-inclusive, see supra note 9,
much of the precedential value of the court's opinion rests in these factors. The pur-
pose of this analysis is to show, based on similar laws from other jurisdictions, how those
factors might develop and why.
51. None of the other cases interprets a statute with Mulkey's "reasonable particular-
ity" standard. Many of the cases proceed on entirely different theories and often are
filed at different stages of the proceeding. In fact, the primary case that established the
"rule of reasonableness" did so based upon a sixth amendment right to be " 'informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation.'" Morris, 61 N.Y.2d at 294-95, 461 N.E.2d at
1259, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 772 (quoting U.S. CONsT. amend. VI). Nevertheless, many of the
cases apparently aspire to the same principle as Mulkey: a way to deal with the delicate
problem of fairness both to the state and to the accused when the victim and principal
witness may be unreliable, through no fault of their own. Moreover, the solutions set
out in some of these cases are remarkably similar to Mulkey's four factors. These cases,
therefore, may serve as guidelines as the "reasonable particularity" standard develops.
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of an offense becomes relevant in a "sexual offense case involving a
child victim."52 Perhaps the court simply intended to give trial
judges broad discretion to consider the seriousness of the particular
charge before requiring them to release a potential child abuser be-
cause of a defective charging document. While trial judges presum-
ably would have this discretion anyway, the fact that the Court of
Appeals spelled it out reinforces its wise position that trial judges
should use these factors as broad guidelines rather than as narrow
commands.5 Beyond this, it is difficult to determine how this factor
will affect the validity of an indictment until trial judges actually ap-
ply it.
(2) The Age and Maturity of the Child.-In considering the child
victim's age and maturity, the court apparently acknowledged that
there are significant differences in the memory and descriptive capa-
bilities of a four-year-old and those of a thirteen-year-old. With an
older victim, the state usually is able to, and perhaps should, de-
scribe more precisely when the abuse occurred. 54 Two New York
cases highlight this distinction. In People v. Morris,55 the New York
Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of an indictment that al-
leged "two sexual criminal acts over a twenty-four-day period
against victims who were only five and six years old."5 6 In People v.
Keindl,5 7 however, the same court overturned fifteen counts of a
thirty-two count sexual abuse indictment that designated time
ranges from one to sixteen months. The Keindl court noted that:
[u]nlike the children in Morris, the victims here were be-
tween 8 and 13 years old during the time of the offenses
and thus more capable than the Morris children of discern-
ing, if not exact dates, at least seasons, school holidays,
birthdays, or other events which could establish a frame of
reference to assist them in narrowing the time spans
alleged.5"
52. Mulkey, 316 Md. at 488, 560 A.2d at 30.
53. See supra note 27.
54. The Mulkey court apparently did not consider the victims' age, although one
count of the indictment indicates that at least one of the victims was under fourteen.
316 Md. at 478 n.3, 560 A.2d at 25 n.3.
55. 61 N.Y.2d 290, 461 N.E.2d 1256, 473 N.Y.S.2d 769 (1984).
56. Id at 296-97, 461 N.E.2d at 1260, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 773.
57. 68 N.Y.2d 410, 502 N.E.2d 577, 509 N.Y.S.2d 790 (1986).
58. Id. at 420, 502 N.E.2d at 581, 509 N.Y.S.2d at 794; see, e.g., People v. Romero,
147 A.D.2d 358, 360-61, 537 N.Y.S.2d 523, 525 (1989) (comparing several New York
cases).
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Similarly, in State v. Hass, 9 the New Jersey Superior Court con-
sidered indictments against two victims, one of whom was between
thirteen- and sixteen-years-old while the other was under thirteen.'
The court remanded the case for reconsideration by the trial judge,
distinguishing an earlier New Jersey case:
The issue in this case is a particularly difficult one because
the time frame in the indictment [approximately five
months] is much shorter than that considered in K.A. W
and the victims, while minors, are not of such a young age
as to be entitled to the same deference as would be ac-
corded to children of "tender years." 6 1
Hence, among courts that have considered carefully the victim's
age as a factor, the issue results in a balancing of age against the
length of time specified in the indictment. While courts have not
established (and probably should not establish) firm cutoffs for
either variable, they have developed some guidelines that Maryland
courts may find useful.
(3) The Victim's Ability to Recall Specific Dates.-This issue is simi-
lar to that encompassed in the second factor. The primary purpose
for considering the victim's age and maturity seemingly is to esti-
mate his or her ability to recall specific dates. Nevertheless, this fac-
tor is more subjective than the previous one, and the two may not
always coincide. For instance, if the victim is relatively young, but
can recall specific dates, "reasonable particularity" may require that
the indictment specify those dates precisely. The converse, how-
ever, is more problematic for defendants. If the victim is old
enough to recall specific dates, but cannot recall the times of the
abuse, prosecutors no doubt will attempt to support a broadly
framed indictment by invoking this factor. It remains to be seen
whether Maryland courts will accept such an indictment as reason-
ably particular.
(4) The State's Good-Faith Efforts and Ability to Determine Reason-
able Dates.-This factor may become the soul of reasonable particu-
larity. Courts frequently write of their concern for child abuse
victims and their reluctance to dismiss charges against alleged abus-
59. 218 N.J. Super. 133, 526 A.2d 1156 (App. Div. 1987).
60. Id. at 135, 527 A.2d at 1157.
61. Id. at 139, 526 A.2d at 1159 (citing State ex rel. K.A.W., 104 NJ. 112, 515 A.2d
1217 (1986)).
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ers on technical grounds.6 2 When the prosecutor demonstrates a
good-faith effort to narrow the time frame of the offense, even the
"reasonableness" states appear willing to allow vague time allega-
tions to stand.63 Indeed, the Court of Special Appeals, when it af-
firmed the trial court's dismissal of Mulkey's indictment, usefully
suggested that "[w]hen the State is unable, with reasonable dili-
gence, to determine the specific time that an offense allegedly oc-
curred, the indictment may be sufficient if the State's inability to be
more specific is contained within the indictment itself."'
What, then, is a good-faith effort by the State? In Morris, a case
that several states have followed,65 the New York Court of Appeals
established the following framework:
Reasonableness and fairness demand that the indictment
state the date and time of the offense to the best of the
People's knowledge, after a reasonably thorough investiga-
tion has been undertaken to ascertain such information. In
evaluating the possibility that a more specific date could
have been obtained through diligent efforts, the court
might consider, among other things: (1) the age and intelli-
gence of the victim and other witnesses; (2) the surround-
ing circumstances; and (3) the nature of the offense,
including whether it is likely to occur at a specific time or is
likely to be discovered immediately. 66
Thus, Morris demonstrates that two of the very factors that Maryland
judges now may use to assess a charging document also can be in-
voked to assess the quality of the State's effort in drafting that
document.67
62. See, e.g., People v. Van Hoek, 200 Cal. App. 3d 811, 818, 246 Cal. Rptr. 352, 357
(1988) ("We too are deeply concerned with the resident child molester and would like
very much for each of them to be brought to justice for their appalling behavior.").
63. See People v. Naugle, 152 Mich. App. 227, 235, 393 N.W.2d 592, 596 (1986). For
a discussion of Naugle, see infra notes 68-75 and accompanying text.
64. Mulkey v. State, 73 Md. App. 501,510, 534 A.2d 1374, 1379 (1988), rev'd, 316 Md.
475, 560 A.2d 24 (1989). The Court of Appeals did not expressly reject or accept this
part of the Court of Special Appeals' decision.
65. See supra note 48.
66. 61 N.Y.2d 290, 296, 461 N.E.2d 1256, 1260, 473 N.Y.S.2d 769, 773 (1984).
67. According to Morris, assessing the quality of the State's effort in drafting the
charging document is only half of the procedure. If the judge finds the State drafted the
charging document in good faith, the judge then may consider whether the time frame is
reasonable:
In making this determination, factors to be considered might include but
should not be limited to the length of the alleged period of time in relation to
the number of individual criminal acts alleged; the passage of time between the
alleged period for the crime and defendant's arrest; the duration between the
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People v. Naugle" provides a clear example of a good-faith ef-
fort. Naugle was convicted of five sexual offenses against his thir-
teen-year-old former stepdaughter; on appeal, he challenged the
imprecision of the dates of the offenses in the indictment.69 A
detective testified that he questioned the victim and "encouraged
her to recall some other events that she could temporally associate
with the assaults."70 The prosecution used these events "as refer-
ence points in zeroing in on the dates that these assaults hap-
pened."7 In one instance, the victim remembered that the assault
occurred on the day of a vacuum cleaner delivery, so the prosecu-
tion could pinpoint that day in the indictment. 2 In another epi-
sode, the detective concluded that the assault occurred between
February 1 and March 18, 1984, after the victim specified that the
assault happened about two weeks before she and her mother en-
tered a shelter, which the mother remembered as occurring on the
latter date.7" In a third incident, the victim recalled that the "snow
accumulation on the ground had melted and that her uncle had
mowed the grass once or twice before they had another snowfall.
The . . . incident occurred after the weather had warmed up
again." ''" The detective, apparently after some weather research,
narrowed this description to "between April 1, 1984, and May 20,
1984."" 5 All three counts of the indictment were upheld in part be-
cause the detective's "testimony suggest[ed] that the prosecution
exerted a good-faith effort to specify the dates."7 6
Two recent Florida cases demonstrate the difference a prosecu-
tor's good-faith effort can make.7 7 In State v. Garcia,78 an indictment
date of the indictment and the alleged offense; and the ability of the victim or
complaining witness to particularize the date and time of the alleged transac-
tion or offense.
Id. For a discussion of some of these factors, see infra text accompanying notes 68-128.
68. 152 Mich. App. 227, 393 N.W.2d 592 (1986). The Naugle court construed the
following statute: "[The court may on motion require the prosecution to state the time
or identify the occasion [of the offense] as nearly as the circumstances will permit, to
enable the accused to meet the charge." MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 767.51 (West 1982).
69. Naugle, 152 Mich. App. at 233, 393 N.W.2d at 595.
70. Id. at 231, 393 N.W.2d at 595.
71. 1& at 232, 393 N.W.2d at 595.
72. I
73. Id
74. Id.
75. Id The opinion implies but does not state that these were the dates in the infor-
mation. Id.
76. Id. at 235, 393 N.W.2d at 596.
77. The Florida cases interpret a rule of procedure whose language is more like that
in Maryland's former rule 71 l(a), supra note 25, than that in current rule 2-402(a). The
Florida rule states: "Each count of an indictment or information upon which the de-
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charged various counts of sexual crimes against a minor occurred
"between the 1st day ofJanuary, 1984 and the 15th day of January,
1986.""9 At a hearing on a motion to dismiss the indictment, the
prosecution indicated that it knew when the abuse began and ended,
plus or minus a few days.8 ° The appellate court concluded, "We
agree with the trial judge that the state appears to have the ability to
allege, at least in two of the counts, a narrower time frame[,]"'' and
affirmed the dismissal of the indictment.8 2 A different Florida ap-
pellate court distinguished Garcia in State v. Jones," in which a de-
fendant was charged with two counts of sexual battery on a five year-
old, with the abuse occurring "between March 1986 and February
12, 1987. ''84 The trial court dismissed the indictment even though
it found that the State had acted in good faith when it specified the
dates of the offenses.8 5 The appellate court reversed. The court
noted that in earlier cases such as Garcia there had been no good-
faith finding by the trial court and suggested that a good-faith at-
tempt to narrow the time frame was sufficient as long as that time
frame was not prejudicial.8 "
Thus, among states in which reasonableness is a factor, a prose-
cutor's good-faith effort to establish the time period in which the
offense occurred goes a long way toward curing a vague indictment.
It is not clear that Maryland will or should require efforts as exten-
sive as those of the Naugle detective, 7 but the Court of Appeals ap-
pears willing to require prosecutors to make some effort to narrow
the time period of the offense. Although the Court of Appeals
found that article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights does not
fendant is to be tried shall contain allegations stating as definitely as possible the time and
place of the commission of the offense charged in the act or transaction .... " FLA. R.
CRIM. P. 3.140(d)(3) (emphasis added); see also Knight v. State, 506 So. 2d 1182, 1183
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (interpreting the rule to require more particularity in an in-
dictment than a three-year time span because the victim could recall her grade in
school).
78. 511 So. 2d 714 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
79. Id. at 715.
80. Id,
81. Id. at 715-16.
82. Id. at 716.
83. 539 So. 2d 535 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
84. ld at 536.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 537; see also Knight v. State, 506 So. 2d 1182, 1183 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1987) (reversing two counts of an indictment, one that covered a four-year period and
the other a three-year period, because "[t]he victim was able to recall before trial inci-
dents in relation to her grade in school, but the State made no attempt to correlate the
first two counts in the information to this testimony.").
87. See 152 Mich. App. 227, 231-33, 393 N.W.2d 592, 594-95 (1986).
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require such efforts,"8 good-faith questioning of witnesses and mod-
est attempts to verify their statements serve the laudable purpose of
informing the defendant of the nature of the charges without unrea-
sonably burdening the State.
b. Other Considerations.-Several states already have established
their own lists of factors to consider to determine the particularity of
an indictment against a child abuser; some of these are similar to the
Court of Appeals' factors.8 9 A number of the factors indicated be-
low were taken from those lists; others were drawn from a review of
applicable cases.
(1) Actual length of time specified in indictment.-A five-year time
allegation is less likely to be reasonably particular than a one-month
time allegation. The Court of Appeals may have considered that
distinction too obvious to list. But at least one state has dismissed
charging documents against child molesters merely because the
time allegations were "so excessive on their face that they [were]
unreasonable."'  More importantly, explicitly listing this as a factor
should encourage judges to consider the other factors in light of the
actual time specified in the charging document. Thus, when the vic-
tim is particularly young, for example, even a two-year time allega-
tion might be acceptable. When the victim is older and capable of
narrowing the time of the offense, however, a one-month time frame
88. Mulkey, 316 Md. at 487-88, 560 A.2d at 30; see also supra note 2.
89. See supra note 48. Probably the most concise version of these similar lists ap-
peared in a Wisconsin case:
(1) the age and intelligence of the victim and other witnesses; (2) the surround-
ing circumstances; (3) the nature of the offense, including whether it is likely to
occur at a specific time or is likely to have been discovered immediately; (4) the
length of the alleged period of time in relation to the number of individual
criminal acts alleged; (5) the passage of time between the alleged period for the
crime and the defendant's arrest; (6) the duration between the date of the in-
dictment and the alleged offense; and (7) the ability of the victim or com-
plaining witness to particularize the date and time of the alleged transaction or
offense.
State v. Fawcett, 145 Wis. 2d 244, 253, 426 N.W.2d 91, 95 (Ct. App.), certif denied, 144
Wis. 2d 955, 428 N.W.2d 553 (1988). In Mulkey, the Court of Appeals did not cite any
cases in its discussion of the four factors. 316 Md. at 488, 560 A.2d at 30.
90. People v. Keindl, 68 N.Y.2d 410, 419, 502 N.E.2d 577, 581, 509 N.Y.S.2d 790,
794 (1986) (dismissing indictments that spanned periods of 10, 12, and 16 months); see
also People v. Romero, 147 A.D.2d 358, 361, 537 N.Y.S.2d 523, 525 (1986) (mem.) (five-
month time frame "unreasonable and unfair given the attending circumstances").
Other courts have accepted charging documents with longer time periods. See State v.
Mancinone, 15 Conn. App. 251, 256, 545 A.2d 1131, 1135 (over two years), certif denied,
209 Conn. 818, 551 A.2d 757 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1132 (1989); State v. Hoban,
738 S.W.2d 536, 539 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (15 months).
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might be reasonable while a two-year time frame might not be.9
(2) Whether the crime alleged is a continuing offense, or whether the
indictment should have been framed that way. 9 2-When the Court of Ap-
peals reviewed the constitutionality of Mulkey's indictment, the
court cited a Connecticut case in which the defendant challenged an
indictment that contained two counts of risk of injury to a minor
child.9" As the Court of Appeals noted, "The Connecticut appellate
court found no error in refusing to require the state to make the
charging documents more specific, reasoning 'where the offense is
of a continuing nature, it may be impossible to provide specific
dates in the charging documents.' "94 Yet, the fact that risk of injury
to a minor child is a continuing offense does not necessarily mean
that sexual abuse is, and at least one court has expressly distin-
guished the two. 95  The Court of Appeals apparently treated
Mulkey's alleged crimes as though they were continuing offenses
without explicitly deciding that they were.96 Other states' decisions
indicate some doubt as to whether the various child or sexual abuse
crimes can be continuing offenses.9 7 When the alleged crime is a
91. See supra notes 54-61 and accompanying text.
92. Morris lists a similar, though not equivalent, factor: "[The length of the alleged
period of time in relation to the number of individual criminal acts alleged." 61 N.Y.2d
290, 296, 461 N.E.2d 1256, 1260, 473 N.Y.S.2d 769, 773 (1984). Presumably, a one-
count indictment covering a five-year time span would be unacceptable because the de-
fendant has no chance to establish an alibi or related defense. Conversely, a 27-count
indictment that covers 30 days would stand because the difference in establishing an
alibi for 27 days rather than 30 days is not important. Where to draw the line between
these two examples is problematic.
93. Mulkey, 316 Md. at 484, 560 A.2d at 28 (citing State v. Mancinone, 15 Conn.
App. 251, 253, 545 A.2d 1131, 1134, certif denied, 209 Conn. 818, 551 A.2d 757 (1988),
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1132 (1989)).
94. Id. at 484-85, 560 A.2d at 28 (quoting Mancinone, 15 Conn. App. at 257, 545 A.2d
at 1135-36).
95. People v. Keindl, 68 N.Y.2d 410, 420-21, 502 N.E.2d 577, 582, 509 N.Y.S.2d
790, 794-95 (1986) (distinguishing sodomy and sexual abuse from the continuing of-
fense of endangering the welfare of a child).
96. "Mulkey was apprised of the continuing nature of the offenses such that his de-
fense was not prejudiced." 316 Md. at 488, 560 A.2d at 30.
97. Cf State v. Spigarolo, 210 Conn. 359, 391, 556 A.2d 112, 129 (1989) (noting
that "[b]ecause the state was unable to specify with greater precision the times of the
alleged incidents [six specific acts likely to impair the health or morals of the victims], it
necessarily proceeded under a theory that the defendant's conduct was in the nature of a
continuing offense"); State v. D.B.S., 216 Mont. 234, 239, 700 P.2d 630, 634 (1985)
(listing "whether a continuing course of conduct is alleged" as one of the criteria for
sufficient particularity of an indictment and suggesting that when it is, further specificity
is not required); Keindl, 68 N.Y.2d at 420, 502 N.E.2d at 581, 509 N.Y.S.2d at 794 (1986)
(declining to apply the "continuous crime" theory to the crimes of sodomy and sexual
abuse).
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continuing offense, the time frame in the charging document neces-
sarily will encompass a range of dates. When conviction depends
upon proof of several components of a single act, however, and
proof of each component at different times does not necessarily im-
ply guilt, reasonable particularity requires a more specific time
allegation.
Moreover, some Maryland authority suggests that a prosecutor
has the option of making sexual abuse crimes continuing offenses by
artful framing of the charging document. In Copsey v. State,9" the
defendant was arrested for various sex crimes against a young boy
that allegedly occurred on almost a daily basis over a five-year pe-
riod.99 Copsey was convicted, but a prosecutor who was unhappy
with the sentence brought new charges that covered a "shorter but
included period of time."'" Before the Court of Special Appeals
considered whether the second charge placed the defendant in
double jeopardy, it discussed the State's charging strategy:
Armed with strong proof of criminal behavior gener-
ally but with little realistic way of pinpointing precise dates,
the State prudently charged the appellant with a single
continuing offense from January 1, 1979, through Novem-
ber 1, 1984. That charging option obviously facilitated the
State's burden of proof. Proof of a sexual offense upon the
victim at any time within the almost six-year period would
suffice to sustain the charge. As a result, of course, the ap-
pellant was thereby placed in jeopardy for any sexual of-
fense he perpetrated upon the victim at any time during
that all-embracing period.''
When considering the reasonable particularity of a charging
document, judges should consider not only whether the crime is a
continuing offense, but whether the prosecution reasonably should
so have framed it in the charging document. 0 2
98. 67 Md. App. 223, 507 A.2d 186 (1986).
99. d at 226, 507 A.2d at 187.
100. Id
101. Id. at 226-27, 507 A.2d at 188. The Court of Special Appeals dismissed the sec-
ond set of charges on double jeopardy grounds. Id. at 234-35, 507 A.2d at 191-92.
102. See also State v. Boozer, 304 Md. 98, 112, 497 A.2d 1129, 1136 (1985) (noting
that the effect of charging a sexual crime under the statutory short form, currently codi-
fied at MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 461C (1987), "limits the State to a single conviction and
punishment for conduct within the section specified, even though more than one offense
embraced by that section may have been committed.").
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(3) Whether the accused was a resident of the victim's home or had fe-
quent access to the victim.--Child sexual abuse crimes often are com-
mitted by someone with frequent unsupervised access to a child.' 3
California courts have considered numerous cases that concern
what they call "resident child molesters," that is, "a person who
either resides in the same home with the minor or has unchecked
access to the child and repeatedly sexually molests the child over a
prolonged period of time."' ° 4 While the California cases generally
concern unanimous verdict theories, 05 they are instructive in deter-
mining the reasonable particularity of a charging document.
In People v. Van Hoek, °6 a California appellate court sided with
the defendant on key issues:
A serious problem with the vague charges and the tes-
timony upon which they are based is that the defendant's
ability to defend is severely hampered. A "resident child
molester" would virtually be precluded from presenting an
alibi defense to the acts unless he could account for every
time he was in the presence of the victim. In the instant
case, defendant, because he was the victim's father and
lived in the household, has no idea what specific time or
specific act he has to defend against. The defendant would
virtually have to account for every day of the last five years
during which he had contact with C. [the child victim] to
enable him to present any kind of alibi defense.'0 7
But subsequent cases have criticized Van Hoek fervently. People v.
Obremski' 0 is probably the best example of the opposing logic:
Van Hoek is incorrect because it attempts to fit the crime to
the defense instead of fitting the defense to the crime. In
cases where the child molester lived with the victim for an
103. See State ex rel. K.A.W., 104 NJ. 112, 119, 515 A.2d 1217, 1220 (1986) ("the
Attorney General reminds us of the depressing statistic that in New Jersey 67.8% of all
children who are molested are related to the molester."); see also D. FINKELHOR, CHILD
SEXUAL ABUSE: NEW THEORY AND RESEARCH 90 (1984) ("Virtually all studies of sexual
abuse have shown that strangers make up only a minority of persons who offend against
children.").
104. People v. Van Hoek, 200 Cal. App. 3d 811, 814 n.l, 246 Cal. Rptr. 352, 354 n.1
(1988).
105. See supra note 39.
106. 200 Cal. App. 3d 811, 246 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1988).
107. Id. at 817, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 356; see also People v. Vargas, 206 Cal. App. 3d 831,
845-47, 253 Cal. Rptr. 894, 901-02 (1988) (following Van Hoek and reversing convictions
on unanimous verdict ground), review denied, id. (Apr. 5, 1989); People v. Atkins, 203 Cal.
App. 3d 15, 19-23, 249 Cal. Rptr. 863, 865-68 (1988) (Van Hoek judge apparently fol-
lowed that case by reproducing a section of it).
108. 207 Cal. App. 3d 1346, 255 Cal. Rptr. 715 (1989).
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extensive, uninterrupted period and therefore had contin-
ual day and night access to the vulnerable child, neither al-
ibi or wrongful identification is likely to be a reasonable
defense. If the victim of a resident molester is able to tes-
tify only to a general sexual interaction with the molester,
the molester himself is likely to be similarly handicapped in
eliciting from his memory specific details concerning the
date, time and place of his activities during the years of his
residence with the victim. Forcing the prosecution to an
election in this factual situation achieves the anomalous re-
sult of subjecting to prosecution only those defendants
who select victims with better memories or who are one act
offenders.1 °9
While the logic of Obremski may be flawed, "0 it appears to achieve a
better balance than Van Hoek, which truly could preclude prosecu-
tion of certain molesters simply because they chose victims with
poor memories.'' Additionally, the fact that the accused was a resi-
109. Id at 1353, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 719-20 (citations omitted). For cases criticizing or
rejecting Van Hoek, see People v. Fernandez, 214 Cal. App. 3d 991, 1003, 263 Cal. Rptr.
139, 145-46 (1989) (collecting all California cases on the Van Hoek issue), reiew granted
and opinion superseded by, 786 P.2d 892, 266 Cal. Rptr. 834 (1990); People v. Moreno, 211
Cal. App. 3d 776, 787, 259 Cal. Rptr. 800, 807 (1989); People v. Avina, 211 Cal. App. 3d
48, 55, 259 Cal. Rptr. 178, 183 (1989); People v. Coulter, 209 Cal. App. 3d 506, 513,
257 Cal. Rptr. 391, 395 (1989); see also State v. Brass, 781 S.W.2d 565, 568 (Mo. App.
1989) (alibi or nonaccess defense not viable because defendant lived in same house with
victim).
110. A victim presumably can help the prosecution by identifying at least two points:
(1) who committed the crime, and (2) when the individual committed it. By its claim that
alibi and wrongful identification are not reasonable defenses for resident defendants,
Obremski comes close to assuming that point (1) is given, and because point (1) is given,
point (2) is relatively unimportant. The accused, of course, wants to use point (2) to
prove that point (1) is not given. And surely it would be small consolation to a wrong-
fully identified defendant, who in fact was out of town on the day that the victim was
molested, to learn that the victim simply was too young to recall the date more
specifically.
111. As this article was going to press, the California Supreme Court resolved this
issue in favor of Obremski in the pivotal case of People v. Jones, 51 Cal. 3d. 34, 792 P.2d
643, 270 Cal. Rptr. 611 (1990) (in bank), modified, No. S010191 (Aug. 28, 1990) (1990
Cal. LEXIS 2642). InJones, not only were the child-victims unable to pinpoint the date
of the abuse, they also were unable to testify specifically about the facts of any one inci-
dent. The court saw these "generic" charges and testimony as potentially implicating
two federal constitutional rights of a defendant: The right to notice of the charges, and
the right to present a defense.
First, the court apparently approved of the view that "the defendant has no right to
notice of the specific time or place of an offense, so long as it occurred within the appli-
cable limitation period." 792 P.2d at 656, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 624. It then concluded that
"given the availability of the preliminary hearing, demurrer and pretrial discovery pro-
cedures, the prosecution of child molestation charges based on generic testimony does
not, of itself, result in a denial of a defendant's due process right to fair notice of the
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dent in the victim's home may reduce the likelihood that the victim
can recall specific dates. As one court noted, "The events blur.""
2
Hence, a reasonably particular indictment perhaps may be less
specific when the accused lived with the victim. But courts should
be careful to distinguish cases in which the molester was not a resi-
dent, lest they foreclose a legitimate opportunity for a defendant to
raise an alibi defense." 3 The dissent in a Missouri case vividly high-
lights the difference between resident and nonresident defendants.
In State v. Hoban,"I 4 a defendant was charged with sexual crimes in a
three-count indictment." 5 The first count named a specific date of
the offense, the other two stated only "between June 1983 and Sep-
charges against him." 792 P.2d at 657, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 625. See supra note 46 and
accompanying text.
TheJones court also rejected the assertion that generic charges and testimony con-
stitutionally impaired a defendant's right to present a defense. First, the court sug-
gested that an alibi or mistaken identity defense is rarely viable in resident child
molester cases. Id; see also infra notes 113-124 and accompanying text. Second, the
court found that generic charges and testimony do not entirely negate the possibility of
raising an alibi defense: "the fact that the defendant has established an alibi covering
some of the time periods alleged in the information could significantly undermine the
victim's testimony as to the remaining counts." Id. Finally, the court noted that even
without an opportunity to present an alibi defense, defendants have ample defenses
available. The court suggested that defendants press the credibility issue by "taking the
witness stand and directly denying any wrongdoing," id, or introduce expert character
evidence suggesting that they had no capacity for molestation, id., or cross-examine the
child-victims to show evidence of past fabrications or to suggest various innocent expla-
nations of the victims' knowledge. 792 P.2d at 658, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 626.
Two justices dissented. Concerning the right to present a defense, the dissenters
suggested that generic testimony hindered not only an alibi defense but also the credi-
bility defense advocated by the majority, particularly in cases involving child victims:
The person faced with generic testimony ... can make only the most gen-
eralized attack on his accuser's credibility. Unable to cross-examine the child as
to the details of the molestation, he can never show, for example, that these
details render the child's story physically impossible, or highly unlikely, or con-
tradictory. The trial strategems recommended by the majority are of dubious
value: whereas a lack of specificity in an adult witness would likely raise ques-
tions about his credibility, a child witness's vagueness may well be seen by the
jury as reflecting simply a lack of cognitive or expressive development. And
generalized character testimony may be given little weight by a jury impressed
by an earnest child victim/witness.
792 P.2d at 665, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 633 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). See also
infra notes 113-123 and accompanying text.
112. State exrel. K.A.W., 104 N.J. 112, 123, 515 A.2d 1217, 1223 (1986).
113. Whether the accused in Mulkey was a resident child molester was not at issue. A
sample count of the indictment suggests that he could have been: "James Elwood
Mulkey ... having responsibility for supervision of U.A.S.], a minor child under the age of
eighteen years, did cause abuse to said minor child .... Mulkey, 316 Md. at 478 n.3,
560 A.2d at 25 n.3 (emphasis added).
114. 738 S.W.2d 536 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
115. Id. at 539.
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tember 1984. '" 116 The defendant, a neighbor of the victim, was ac-
quitted on the first two counts and convicted on the third.'1 7 On
appeal, he asserted that it was impossible for him to establish an
alibi defense over a fifteen-month period."' The majority rejected
this argument." 9 A dissenting judge, who considered the facts in
more detail, pointed out that the defendant was acquitted of the first
charge partly because he established an alibi for the date alleged.'
20
In contrast, the third count required him to establish his absence
over an unreasonably long period. 12 1 The judge noted, "I have
found no case in which a time period comparable to this has been
allowed against a person who was not a resident or frequent visitor
in the victim's home."' 22 Indeed, perhaps the prosecution would
have won a conviction on the first count as well if it had specified the
time frame more vaguely. Hoban suggests that an alibi defense is
too important to allow the prosecution to have de facto control over
a defendant's ability to invoke it.
123
Thus, the issue of whether the accused was a resident is largely
a consideration of the plausibility of an alibi or related defense.
When the accused is neither a resident nor has frequent un-
supervised access to the victim, an alibi defense is more likely to be
plausible, and a reasonably specific indictment ought to give the ac-
cused a chance to establish such a defense.
(4) Whether the accused actually claims an alibi defense.-A New
Jersey court added "alibi defense" as a consideration to the Morris
factors. 12 4 Several other courts have vigorously rejected it.1 25 It
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id at 541.
120. Id at 545 (Smith, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 546.
122. Id at 548.
123. But see People v. Jones, 57 Cal. 3d 34, 792 P.2d 643, 656-58, 270 Cal. Rptr. 611,
624-26 (1990) (discussed supra at note 111).
124. State ex reL K.A.W., 104 NJ. 112, 123, 515 A.2d 1217, 1223 (1986) ("[T]o the
extent the juvenile or criminal defendant makes known his defense-here, non-involve-
ment, supplemented by an alibi for a brief period during the 20-month span-that too
may be placed in [sic] the scales."); see People v. Morris, 61 N.Y.2d 290, 296, 461 N.E.2d
1256, 1260, 473 N.Y.S.2d 769, 773 (1984) (factors).
125. See Vail v. State, 536 N.E. 302, 303 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (asserting that "whether
or not the state complied with the requirements of the alibi statute... has nothing to do
with whether the information was sufficient to charge an offense."); People v. Naugle,
152 Mich. App. 227, 234, 393 N.W.2d 592, 596 (1986) (stating that "we do not believe
that [an intention to assert an alibi defense] must necessarily militate in favor of either
requiring specificity or dismissing the charges against a defendant .... A defendant
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seems very unlikely that a court would dismiss a time-range indict-
ment merely because a defendant asserted an alibi defense. Perhaps
a better consideration is an expansion of the factor discussed above,
that is, whether the asserted defense is reasonable under the circum-
stances. An alibi defense is not reasonable, for instance, when the
accused lived with the victim and allegedly molested her over a long
period of time. It may be reasonable, however, when there were few
instances of abuse and the accused had very limited access to the
victim.
(5) Length of time since the abuse occurred.-Elapsed time as a fac-
tor was listed in Morris "' and applied by R.A.R. 2  In the latter
case, the time frames of four counts of an indictment were very simi-
lar to those alleged in Mulkey.' 28 But the court decided that the
charges were not sufficiently definite because over five years had
elapsed between the last offense and the filing of the complaint, and
considerably more time between the first and last offenses.12 9 While
a lapse this long occurs only rarely, it may be worth remembering
should it happen in Maryland. It is one thing for a defendant to
remember what he was doing last summer, but it is quite another to
remember a summer five years past.
4. Conclusion.-The Court of Appeals has made a prudent first
step toward establishing standards for trial judges to use when they
review time-of-offense allegations against child abusers.' 30 Vague
time frames have generated a burst of litigation in recent years.'
3
'
Many of the theories defendants have used in other states have yet
to be tested in Maryland. The court's standards, carefully applied,
could pre-empt costly mistakes by prosecutors while still assuring
fairness for the accused.
There is much to learn from the mistakes of others, and Mary-
land would do well to consider both the problems manifested in
out-of-state litigation and the solutions that some courts are testing.
0
would simply have to make the assertion of alibi in order to escape prosecution once it
became apparent that a child was confused with respect to the date of a sexual assault.").
126. 61 N.Y.2d 290, 296, 461 N.E.2d 1256, 1260, 473 N.Y.S.2d 769, 773 (1984).
127. 148 Wis. 2d 408, 411-12, 435 N.W.2d 315, 316-17 (Ct. App. 1988).
128. "The complaint alleged that the first and second charges occurred 'during the
spring of 1982,' the third 'during the summer of 1982' and the fourth 'during the sum-
mer of 1983 .... .' " Id. at 409, 435 N.W.2d at 315-16.
129. Id. at 412, 435 N.W.2d at 317.
130. Mulkey, 316 Md. at 488, 560 A.2d at 30.
131. See infra notes 37-44.
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In a time when one or more of every ten girls is molested, 1 2 and
when false accusations of molestation are not unknown,13 3 courts
ought to be prepared to deal swiftly and judiciously with those ac-
cused of the offense.
JOHN J. CONNOLLY
132. The actual figure is hard to pinpoint. See D. FINKELHOR, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE:
NEW THEORY AND RESEARCH 1-2 (1984).
133. See, e.g., Ackerman, Child Sexual Abuse: Bona Fide or Fabricated? 1 AM. J. FAM. L.
181 (1987); Schuman, False Accusations of Physical and Sexual Abuse, 14 BULL. Am. AcAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 5 (1986).
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